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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
DAVID L. CALLIES* 
INTRODUCTION 
Government ownership ofland has always carried with it a series 
of public obligations that collectively limit the use of such land (usually 
for public rather than commercial or other private-like purposes) as 
well as its transfer or disposal. Thus, if a government holds or ac-
quires a parcel ofland, it may, for example, broadly use it for park, 
recreation, or government-administrative functions (such as postal 
services, fire and police stations, and other government offices). Also, 
broadly speaking, a government may sell or lease such land if it is 
found to be surplus, and typically it will be subject to no more than a 
disposal statute or regulation, which may require a public auction or 
other generalized offer to potential buyers or lessees. An exception 
is land which the government formally holds in trust for the public, 
subject to the public trust doctrine. 
Broadly stated, the public trust doctrine provides that the govern-
ment holds certain submerged and adjacent lands, waters, and (in-
creasingly) other resources in trust for the benefit of its citizens, 
establishing the right of the public to fully enjoy them for a variety 
of public uses and purposes. Implied in this definition are limitations 
on the private use of such water, land, or other resources, as well as 
limitations on the government to transfer interests in those resources 
to private parties, particularly if such transfer will prevent or ham-
per their use by the public. These limitations give rise to questions 
including: (1) What is the distinction between the application ofthe 
public trust doctrine and the truism that government always holds 
land in trust for its citizens? (2) How and to what resources besides 
water and lands immediately adjacent to water does the public trust 
doctrine apply-does it apply to inland trails and trailheads, for 
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example? (3) What private uses can the government permit on public 
trust water or land, short of sales or other transfers, which are gen-
erally prohibited--can the government permit private wharves for the 
loading and the unloading of passengers or freight from private ves-
sels, for example? (4) Is public access to a public trust resource-like 
a pathway across private land to a public beach, for example-
automatically a part ofthe public trust, or must that access be sep-
arately acquired by the government from the private landowner? 
1. THE PuBuc TRUST DOCTRINE DEFINED 
The public trust doctrine ("PTD") may mean many things to many 
people, but there is usually at least a sharp divide between the 
common-law PTD universally associated with water, on the one hand 
(with roots in Roman law as it was practiced in England and as it 
came to the United States), and the universal principle that waters 
and lands held by the government are usually, if not always, held in 
trust for its citizens. Unfortunately, much literature and many courts 
confuse the two, with serious consequences for the public and private 
sector alike. For example, the common-law PTD has historically been 
applied only to water and resources directly related to water (riparian 
land, submerged land, and so forth), whereas the latter universal, 
general trust principle extends (by state statute and constitution, in 
many cases) to all manner of natural resources "owned" by the gov-
ernment. PTD resources are almost always held by-and are inalien-
able by-the government, and are limited to use by the public for 
purposes such as fishing, fowling, and the like. Resources merely 
held in general trust for the people are usually freely alienable and 
useable for a variety of private and commercial purposes (usually ac-
cording to applicable public procurement law)l such as mineral ex-
ploration and extraction, with caveats that holding such resources 
for the public usually carries with it the need to preserve some sem-
blance of public use and enjoyment. Aside from this critical distinc-
tion, this Paper focuses entirely on the uses of, and access to, PTD 
resources and the extent to which this formal designation is applicable 
beyond the traditional trust resources of water and water-related land. 
1. See DANIELLE M. CONWAY, STATE AND LoCAL GoVERNMENT PROCUREMENT (2012). 
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II. THE PuBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE BEYOND INTERESTS IN WATER: 
NOT So MUCH 
There is little uniform application of the public trust doctrine among 
the states. The doctrine was first recognized in American law in the 
early nineteenth century in Arnold v. Mundy,2 which held that, like 
England, submerged lands belong to the sovereign.3 Within a few de-
cades, the doctrine was expanded to include navigable waters.4 Thus, 
the state owns and holds PTD waters that are navigable-in-fact, but 
lands submerged beneath non-navigable waters can be owned pri-
vately.5 The doctrine has been expanded by some states, as certain 
courts extended the doctrine to include non-navigable waters,6 ground 
water,7 and (rarely) parklands.8 
Many states have only extended the scope of the PTD beyond its 
traditional common-law application covering navigable waterways 
and tidelands to include more water resources, such as non-naviga-
ble waters, drinking water, groundwater, wetlands, all submerged 
or submersible lands, and even public ownership of all water in the 
state.9 In 2007 and 2008, for example, eight Great Lakes states en-
tered the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources 
2. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). 
3. Id. at 8, 32; see also Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845) (ruling that the 
federal government held tidal·submerged lands in trust for future states prior to statehood). 
4. See, e.g., McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1, 18, 30 (1856); Phillips Petroleum Co:.v. 
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 484--85 (1988) (confirming that lands beneath both tidal and navi· 
gable·in·fact waters were state-owned public trust lands). 
5. See generally Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The 
Accomnwdation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649, 650 (2010). 
6. See, e.g., Montana Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 
1984); State v. McIlroy, 595 S.W.2d 659 (Ark. 1980); Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823 (S.D. 
2004). 
7. Infra notes 70--71 and accompanying text (for information about Hawai'i and the 
Waiahole Ditch cases). Vermont has statutes declaring that groundwater resources are held 
in trust for the public, while the Great Lake States hold the lake water in trust for the public. 
8. See, e.g., Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11, 15 (Ill. 1970); 
Friends of Van Cortland Park v. New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.y. 2001). 
9. For a meticulous summary of all fifty states' public trusts, including PTDs and the 
several issues they present, see Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern 
Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2007), and Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western 
States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an 
Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGYL. Q. 53 (2010) [hereinafter Craig, Western States' Public 
Trust Doctrines]. 
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Compact, which, among other things, established a compact-wide PTD 
whose scope reaches waters beyond the individual states' common-
law doctrines.lO Among other things, such extensions of the public 
trust doctrine have generated tensions between state PTDs and pre-
existing private-water rights-especially in the West where water is 
generally less plentiful, prior appropriation rights dominate, and con-
veyances of water resources and the lands underlying them often pre-
date the states' succession to federal public trust rights at statehood. 11 
Few states, however, have expanded their PTDs to include lands 
and natural resources beyond water and the land beneath it. Al-
though around twenty states might claim to have done so in some 
fashion-through language about holding resources in trust for the 
public in state constitutions, statutes, or case law-few of these have 
done so by expressly referencing the common-law public trust doc-
trine. Rather, they vaguely note that some resources are held in some 
sort of "public trust.,,12 These expansions of the general state lan-
guage about trusts for the public result in the coverage of wildlife and 
other natural resources such as air and minerals. These expansions 
have been mandated by constitutions and statutes as well as declared 
by appellate courts. In 1998, for example, the Alaska Supreme Court 
extended its PTD to cover all naturally occurring wildlife and miner-
als, based in part on several sections of the state constitution, 13 but 
it took a half step back the following year, describing the State's 
authority over wildlife and minerals to be merely trust-like but not 
a formal enlargement of the State's PTD.14 Iowa followed a similar 
path, first suggesting that the State's PTD extended to public re-
sources beyond water15 and then narrowing its interpretation so as not 
to preclude the removal of natural timber from public lands adminis-
tered by the conservation board. 16 The court noted that "[t]he purpose 
10. Bridget Donegan, Comment, The Great Lakes Compact and the Public Trust Doctrine: 
Beyond Michigan and Wisconsin Common Law, 24 J. ENVTL. L. & LlTIG. 455 (2009). 
11. Craig, Western States' Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 9. 
12. Id. Such states include Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawai'i, 
Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia. Id. 
13. Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1998). 
14. Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031-32 (Alaska 1999). 
15. Fencl v. City of Harper's Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808 (Iowa 2000); see also Larman v. State, 
552 N.W.2d 158 (Iowa 1996). 
16. Bushby v. Washington Cty. Conservation Bd., 654 N.W.2d 494 (Iowa 2002). 
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of the public-trust doctrine is to prohibit states from conveying im-
portant natural resources to private parties" not the prevention of 
forestry management. 17 In Virginia, a federal court extended the PTD 
"to protect and preserve" the state's "natural wildlife resources" when 
the state and federal governments sued for damages in the death of 
waterfowl following an oil spill in the Chesapeake Bay.ls 
California, in its Fish and Game Code, proclaims that "[t]he fish 
and wildlife resources are held in trust for the people of the state [but 
not squarely through the public trust doctrine] by and through the 
[D]epartment [ofFish and Game] ."19 This provision has been upheld 
by a California appellate court when it granted summary judgment 
for private windmill operators in a suit brought by activists over bird 
deaths caused by wind turbines.20 The court held that the plaintiffs 
should have sued the County of Alameda, instead, as the responsi-
ble public agency.21 Connecticut, by statute, has created a public 
trust in the state's air and natural resources, and granted private 
parties the right to sue both governmental and private entities to 
protect them.22 An Ohio code section-apparently in an attempt to 
justify laws regulating hunting-gives the state "title to all wild ani-
mals, not legally confined or held [privately] ... in trust for the benefit 
of all the people.,,23 The code in West Virginia does the same and 
specifically includes fish and amphibians.24 Hawai'i's constitution, 
after declaring the need to balance conservation with self-suffi-
ciency, states that "[a]ll public natural resources are held in trust by 
the State for the benefit of the people.,,25 Michigan's constitution ob-
liquely refers to the "public trust in air ... or other natural resources" 
when discussing a conservation fund26 but in practice follows a tra-
ditional form of the public trust doctrine. None of these courts or 
legislatures specifically reference the public trust doctrine, however. 
17. Id. at 497 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
18. In re Stewart Transp. Co., 498 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
19. CAL. FISH & GAME § 711.7 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 5 of 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
20. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., 83 Cal Rptr. 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
21. Id. at 606-07. 
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a·16 (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Supplement). 
23. DHlO REV. CODE ANN. § 1531.02 (West, Westlaw through Files 1 to 76 of the 130th 
Gen. Assembly (2013-2014». 
24. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-3-3 (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
25. HAw. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
26. MICH. CONST. art. XI, § 40. 
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New York arguably represents the most expansive of such public 
trusts, so far. Under its constitution and statutes, New York's forest-
preserve lands and specified state parks are forever inalienable and 
to be kept in a natural state, with timber removal for any reason pro-
hibited.27 The New York Supreme Court, since 1871, has held that 
municipalities hold parklands in trust for the public,28 and more 
recently a host of opinions have reiterated that" [d]edicated park areas 
in New York State are impressed with a public trust.,,29 A state ap-
pellate court has even held that a municipal parking lot could be 
within such public trusts if dedicated to public use by deed or legis-
lative act, but it was unwilling to consider use alone in that context: 
"While a parcel's continuous use as a public park or recreational 
area may impress that parcel with a public trust by implication, the 
petitioners have cited no authority for the proposition that a parking 
lot may achieve public trust status through such means.,,30 
In Illinois jurisprudence, which also breaks from tradition, the PTD 
applies not only to submerged lands but also to parks and conserva-
tion areas as long as they have been dedicated as such.31 Classifica-
tion of property as a "park" on a village land-use plan is insufficient 
to trigger the PTD.32 
To establish a right to a remedy under the [public trust] doctrine, 
[a] plaintiff ill ust allege facts showing certain property is held by 
a government body for a given public use; the government body 
has taken action that would cause or permit the property to be 
used for purposes inconsistent with its originally intended public 
use; and such action is arbitrary or unreasonable.33 
Much less ambitious than New York or Illinois, Colorado's con-
cept of "public trust" land extends to state school lands, which are 
"held in a perpetual, inter-generational public trust for the support 
27. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERVATION LAw § 9·0301 (West, Westlaw 
through L.2014, chapters 1 to 17). 
28. Brooklyn Park Comm'rs v. Armstrong, 45 N.Y. 234 (1871). 
29. Grayson v. Town of Huntington, 160 A.D.2d 835 (1990); see also Johnson v. Town of 
Brookhaven, 230 A.D.2d 774 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996). 
30. 10 E. Realty, LLC v. Incorporated Vill. of Valley Stream, 49 A.D. 3d 764 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2008), reu'd on other grounds, 907 N.E.2d 274 (N.Y. 2009). 
31. Timothy Christian Sch. v. Vill. of Western Springs, 675 N.E.2d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). 
32. Id. at 174-75. 
33. Id. at 174 (quoting Paschen v. Vill. of Winnetka, 73 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1028 (1979». 
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of public schools.,,34 In Alabama, the state constitution creates a 
"Forever Wild Land Trust" that buys and holds areas of natural 
beauty in trust for the people, however the trustee is not the State 
but an appointment board.35 Unquestionably, the most extreme exam-
pIe of potentially expanding the public trust doctrine to lands with 
no relationship to water comes from Hawai'i, where plaintiffs seek-
ing to block the construction of the world's largest reflecting tele-
scope just off the summit of the state's 13,900-foot mountain, Mauna 
Kea, have challenged its construction in part on public trust doctrine 
grounds. The site is in an "astronomy precinct" on land leased by the 
University of Hawai'i from the State, and thirteen astronomical tele-
scopes are already built and operating in the precinct.36 In an earlier 
concurring opinion dealing with due process, two justices of the state 
supreme court specifically asked for thorough consideration of the ap-
plication of the public trust doctrine to the site, which is dozens-of 
miles from the nearest navigable water, and, of course-at thirteen 
thousand feet-never submerged.37 However, in its subsequent opinion 
upholding a state department's granting a permit for the construc-
tion, the court failed to address the application of the PTD-as a 
concurring justice correctly observed-but instead held only that all 
public lands, like those on Mauna Kea, were held in some sort of 
trust for the public.38 PTD in Hawai'i, so far, applies only to water. 
While a few commentators have suggested that the public trust 
doctrine should be applied to some or all natural resources every-
where,39 few courts have accepted this extension. Thus, for example, 
only the Supreme Courts of California, New Jersey, and Vermont have 
gone so far as to declare the PTDs in their states are elastic and 
34. COLO. CoNST. art. IX, § 10. 
35. ALA. CaNST. art. XI, § 219.08. 
36. In re Contested Case Hearing re Conservation District Use Application (Mauna Kea 
11), 431 P.3d 752, 773-75, 143 Haw. 379, 400-03 (2018). See, for commentary on Hawai'i's 
version of the public trust doctrine as well as an argument for more than one public trust 
doctrine, Thomas W. Merrill, The Public Trust Doctrine: Some Jurisprudential Variations and 
Their Implications, 38 U. HAw. L. REV. 261 (2016). 
37. Mauna Kea Anaina Hou v. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res. (Mauna Kea I), 363 P.3d 224, 
251-57, 136 Haw. 376, 403-09 (2015). 
38. Mauna Kea II, 431 P.3d at 785-87, 773-75. 143 Haw. at 412-14. 
39. Hope Babcock, Is Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Protect Public Parkland from Vu;ual 
Pollution Justifiable Doctrinal Creep?, 42 ECOLOGYL.Q. 1 (2015); Michael C. Blumm & Rachel 
D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and 
Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 741 (2012). 
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should evolve with the needs of the people they benefit.40 On the other 
hand, in Sanders-Reed v. Martinez,41 the New Mexico court held that 
the public trust doctrine did not empower the judicial branch to es-
tablish the best way to protect the atmosphere, citing decisions from 
other jurisdictions who also refused to extend the PTD to the atmo-
sphere.42 Indeed, some states have refused to extend the PTD from 
surface water to underground water.43 
At least three states have recognized or created public trusts 
separate from, and as alternatives to broadening the scope of, their 
existing common -law PTDs. In Connecticut, the courts have applied 
two notions of "public trust": a common-law PTD "under which the 
state holds in trust for public use title in waters and submerged lands 
waterward ofthe mean high tide line,,,44 and a statutory public trust 
that "provides broadly that any person or corporation may maintain 
an action for declaratory and equitable relief against the state ... for 
the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural 
resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or 
destruction.,,45 Moreover, according to the state supreme court, both 
types of "public trusts" are distinct from the principle that public 
parks and beaches are held by municipalities "for the benefit of the 
residents of the state.,,46 
As noted by one PTD scholar, "several states have extended the 
concept of a public trust in waters to environmental protection," 
creating what she calls an "ecological public trust. California and 
Hawai'i have most extensively developed their ecological public trust 
doctrines,"47 and they have done so by making law apart from the 
40. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (en bank); Borough 
of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A2d 47 (N.J. 1972); Raleigh Ave. Beach 
Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A2d 112 (N.J. 2005) (reaffirming principle discussed in 
Borough of Neptune City); State v. Cent. Vermont Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989). 
41. 350 P.3d 1221 (N.M. Ct. App. 2015). 
42.Id. 
43. See Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Bd., 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2018). 
44. Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 815 A2d 1188, 1192-93 nA (Conn. 2003) 
(quoting Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A2d 552 (Conn. 2001». 
45. Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. City of New London, 925 A.2d 292 (Conn. 2007) 
(quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-16 (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Supplement» 
(internal quotations and ellipses omitted). 
46. Alves, 815 A2d at 1193 nA. 
47. Craig, Western States' Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 9, at 71. 
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traditional common-law doctrine related to waterways and tidelands. 
In 2008, the California Supreme Court decided that there are 
two distinct public trust doctrines[:] ... the common law doc-
trine, which involves the government's affirmative duty to take 
the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of 
water resources ... [and] a public trust duty derived from stat-
ute, specifically Fish and Game Code section 711.7, pertaining 
to fish and wildlife.48 
Arguably, Hawai'i boasts four public trusts: (1) a navigable-waters 
PTD under traditional common law; (2) a Native Hawaiian "public" 
trust derived from Hawaiian history and culture under which chiefs 
and, later, the monarchy held all water in trust for the people; (3) a 
statutory public trust set out in the State Water Code, which incor-
porates both (1) and (2) and, among other things, provides for a Com:. 
mission on Water Resource Management to regulate uses of both 
groundwater and surface water via an often contentious permitting 
process; and (4) a constitutional public trust over the lands returned 
by the federal government at statehood, benefiting Native Hawaiians 
and the public at large.49 All four public trusts are supported under 
Hawai'i's Constitution. 50 
In sum, courts, legislators, and state constitutions often declare 
various lands and other resources to be held in trust for the public. 
However, they rarely declare such land and resources to be subject 
to the public trust doctrine. 
III. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 
While it is true that sometimes public property held in trust for 
the public is subject to the public trust doctrine, the situation is some-
what different with respect to private property. There are two major 
lines of cases: first, those cases in which a state was allowed to convey 
48. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. California Dep't of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888,926 
(Cal. 2008). 
49. &e Craig, Western States' Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 9, at 86-88, 118-27 
(discussing the complex nature and history of water, land, and the public trust in Hawai'i); 
HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-1 to -101 (West, Westlaw through Act 247 ofthe 2013 Reg. Sess_) 
(setting forth Hawai'i's state water code). 
50. HAw. CONST_, art. XI, §§ 1, 7; id_ art_ XII, § 4. 
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public trust lands to a private property owner because a public pur-
pose was still being served and the public trust lands were not ad-
versely affected by the conveyance, and second, those cases in which 
a state conveyed, outright, lands held in the trust for the public.51 
However, in the second line of cases, the private owners could only 
use such lands insofar as the use was consistent with the public trust 
doctrine. Regardless of which line of reasoning the courts adopted, 
the main point appears to be that private use of public trust lands, 
whether or not clearly subject to the public trust doctrine, is allowed, 
so long as it furthers the purpose of the public trust. 
A. Illinois Central and Private Interests 
In the landmark 1892 case, fllinois Central Railroad v. Illinois,52 
the United States Supreme Court provided that a state 
can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole 
people are interested, like navigable waters and the soils under 
them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of 
private parties, ... than it can abdicate its police powers in the 
administration of government and the preservation of the peace. 53 
Illinois Central did provide that privatization of public trust doc-
trine resources could occur if the conveyance furthered a public pur-
pose and there was no substantial impairment of remaining trust 
resources. 54 Several cases have adopted these Illinois Central excep-
tions, notably in California with Boone v. Kingsbury (though this case 
has not been cited by any other case, in California or elsewhere).55 
In Boone, the California Supreme Court upheld leases given to pri-
vate parties to drill oil on trust lands, concluding that it would not 
substantially interfere with the trust and noting that the State could 
revoke the leases if there was substantialinterference.56 In Wisconsin, 
the state supreme court upheld the conveyance of submerged lands 
of Lake Michigan to a private party because it was part of a larger 
public scheme. 57 
51. See infra discussion in Part III. 
52. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
53. Id. at 453-54. 
54.Id. 
55. 273 P. 797 (Cal. 1928). 
56. Id. at 816. 
57. City of Milwaukee v. State, 214 N. W. 820, 830 (Wis. 1927); accord State v. VilI. of Lake 
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Generally, in cases where a state has conveyed a public trust inter-
est, private parties are still burdened by the public trust doctrine. 
After fllinois Central, the public trust doctrine did not require full 
public ownership oflands; privatization was (and is) allowed as long 
as the res publicum is maintained. Almost a century later, the U.S. 
Supreme Court recognized that individual states may define the 
lands held in public trust and recognize private rights in such lands.58 
B. Examples of Private Interests in Public Trust (Doctrine) Property 
Generally, as long as the property is not placed beyond the state's 
control and the private party is upholding the interests of the public 
trust (doctrine), private use of public trust resources is allowed. Es-
sentially, the private party becomes the trustee for that particular 
parcel. Should the private party cease to use the property in a way 
that benefits the public trust, the state can reclaim that land, even 
if it appears to be held by the private property owner in fee simple. 
1. Alaska 
A corporation and caretaker filed an action against a fisherman 
for trespass in CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker. 59 The Alaska Supreme 
Court found that the corporation could not maintain the action against 
the fisherman because, while the property had been conveyed by the 
State to the private corporation, it was still subject to the public trust. 
Thus, there was a continued public easement across the property.60 
2. California 
In 1971, the California Supreme Court decided Marks v. Whitney,61 
recognizing that a landowner could have private interests (possession 
and alienation) in public trust land but that interest was burdened 
Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622 (Wise. App. 1979); W. Indian Co. v. Gvv't of Virgin Islands, 643 F. 
Supp. 869 (I).V.L 1986). See also State v. S. Sand & Material Co., 167 SW. 854, 856 (Ark. 
1914) (upholding the legislature's authority to sell sand and gravel, as it did not impair the 
right of common enjoyment). 
58. Phillips PetroL Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.s. 469,475 (1988). 
59. 755 P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1988). 
60.Id. 
61. 491 P.2d 374 (CaL 1971). 
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by the public's rights.62 Thus, private development or use was re-
strained if it was inconsistent with the public's rights.63 This has been 
followed by New York,64 South Carolina,65 and Michigan.66 
In a more recent California Supreme Court decision, the court 
found that there was continuous state supervision of public trust re-
sources, regardless of whether the property was in public or private 
ownership.67 This principle has been followed by several other dis-
tricts; for example, in the Vermont cases cited below,68 as well as in 
New Jersey69 and Hawai'i.70 Courts following this doctrine do not elim-
inate private property but rather place conditions on it (e.g., should 
the property no longer be used for the public trust, the state has a 
right of re-entry).71 Thus, while private property interests are not 
eliminated, they can be restricted, especially with respect to develop-
ment rights.72 
3. Idaho 
In Kootenai EnvironmentalAlliance v. Panhandle iacht Club, 73 the 
plaintiff environmental group sued to stop a private dock from being 
62.Id. 
63. Id. at 380-81. 
64. Arnold's Inn, Inc. v. Morgan, 35 A.D.2d 987, 993 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1970) (ordering a land-
owner to remove fill he put in a bay). 
65. McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (S.C. 2003) (denying 
a takings claim concerning the denial of a fill permit for Myrtle Beach). 
66. Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Mich. 2005) (holding that public trust gave the 
public access to privately owned lands along the Great Lakes below mean high water mark). 
67. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court (MOM Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983). 
68. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. 
69. Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A.2d 112, 121 (N.J. 2005) 
(requiring an upland private property owner to provide public access to the water even though 
public use of the upland is subject to an accommodation of interest of the owner). 
70. In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole 1),9 P.3d 409,452,454 (Haw. 2000) 
(citing MOM Lake as instructive and indicating a preference to accommodate both instream 
and offstream uses where feasible); In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole II), 93 
P.3d 643, 658 (Haw. 2004) (noting that public and private water uses should be evaluated on 
a case-by-case basis when considering the public trust). 
71. See Waiahole 1,9 P.3d 409 (The court affirmed the authority ofthe state to grant non-
vested usufructuary rights to appropriate water even if the diversions harm public trust uses. 
Courts and agencies are required to approve such diversions and to minimize harm to the 
trust); Waiahole II, 93 P.3d 643 (affirming the same authority as Waiahole 1); see also Ctr. for 
Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., 83 Cal Rptr. 3d 588, 601 (Cal. App. 2008). 
72. See Blumm, supra note 5, at 650. 
73. 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983). 
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built on a lake.74 The Idaho Supreme Court ultimately held that al-
though the grant to build the dock was subject to the public trust 
doctrine, it did not violate the doctrine since there was a navigational 
or economic necessity to justify the permit.75 Moreover, the court 
found there would be no adverse effect on the property, navigation, 
fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, 
or water quality.76 
In subsequent cases, the State attempted to construct a public 
beach, docks, and parking lot on property the landowner allegedly 
owned in fee simple. Ultimately, the court concluded that the State 
failed to demonstrate that the property in question was subject to 
the public trust doctrine; therefore, the State was enjoined from its 
construction since the plan exceeded the district's rights under the 
easement over the property.77 
4. Illinois 
A century ago, in People ex rel. Attorney General v. Kirk,78 the 
Illinois Supreme Court found that the legislature had the power to 
convey lands held under the public trust doctrine in order to build 
boulevards and driveways, because the public interest was not im-
paired.79 Similarly, in a 2003 case the Illinois Supreme Court found 
that collecting an admission fee did not ipso facto diminish or impair 
the rights of the public in the trust.so Although in that case it was 
determined that there were no private interests at issue, presumably 
if there was a private interest in public trust lands that involve charg-
ing a nominal fee, it would likely be upheld-so long as the public 
interest was served and the rights ofthe public were not harmed.81 
Worth noting and following is the erupting litigation in Illinois 
that has attempted to block the location of the Obama Presidential 
74. [d. 
75. [d. at 1095. 
76. [d. at 1095-96. 
77. See Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvem't Dist., 733 P.2d 
733 (Idaho 1987), further reviewed in Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed 
Improvem't Dist., 17 P.3d 260 (Idaho 2000). 
78. 45 N.E. 830 (Ill. 1896). 
79. [d. 
80. Friends of Parks v. Chicago Park Dist., 786 N.E.2d 161, 168 (Ill. 2003). 
81. [d. 
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Library on Chicago lake front parkland.82 Chicago is contesting the 
objectors' claims both that the parkland, having never been sub-
merged, could be subject to the public trust doctrine as interpreted 
in the fllinois Central case and that such a quasi-public use would, 
in any event, be inconsistent with the res publicum in the parkland, 
noting that a museum and a planetarium already sit on such land.83 
The issues are strikingly similar to those raised in Hawai'i's TMT 
case,84 where the first issue-about the mountain failing to be subject 
to the PTD because it had never been submerged-was studiously 
avoided by the Hawai'i Supreme Court. However the court clearly 
and unanimously held that the telescope, to be built by a consortium 
of universities, would, in any event, be an appropriate use not con-
flicting with a res publicum. It also noted that other telescopes were 
already constructed on the summit and slopes of the state-owned, 
mountaintop land.85 
5. New Jersey 
An interesting case is that of Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis 
Beach Club,86 in which a private beach club charged its members a 
fee to access the private beach.87 Basing its decision on Matthews v. 
Bay Head Improvement Ass'n,88 the New Jersey Supreme Court found 
that the private beach had to be opened to the public for a reasonable 
fee (the amount to be determined later by the State).89 In a round-
about way, this could be construed as an example of a private use or 
benefit of public trust land, especially if the members paid a differ-
ent fee structure than the public. 
82. Protect Our Parks, Inc. v. Chicago Park Dist., No. 1:18·CV·03424, 2018 WL 2194256 
(U.S.D.C.IN.D. Ill. 2019). 
83. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of their Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Protect Our Parks, Inc., 2018 WL 2194256 (filed Nov. 21, 2018). 
84. See In re the Contested Case Hearing re Conservation District Use Application 
(CDU A) for the Thirty Meter Telescope of the Mauna Key Science Reserve, SCOT ·17 ·0000705 
(Haw. 2018). 
85. In re Contested Case Hearing re Conservation District Use Application (Mauna Kea 
II), 431 P.3d 752, 773-75, 785-87, 143 Haw. 379, 400-03, 412-14 (2018). 
86. 879 A2d 112 (N.J. 2005). 
87. Id. at 12l. 
88. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvem't Ass'n, 471 A2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
89. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc., 879 A2d at 124. 
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6. Rhode Island 
In a Rhode Island case, a town sought to enjoin a ferry boat from 
docking over a pond.90 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that 
while the State had transferred all "right[s], titleL] and interest[s]" 
of the pond to the town, the State did not relinquish its public trust 
responsibilities.91 Because there was a state statute allowing the ferry 
boat company exclusive jurisdiction over development and opera-
tions, the court ruled that the town could not enjoin the company's 
activities despite violations of the town's zoning laws.92 
7. Texas 
In City of Galveston v. Menard,93 the Supreme Court of Texas up-
held the validity of a land patent for submerged beds, noting that 
while ordinarily it is best to devote the State's water interests to public 
use, sometimes the public's use and enjoyment of property can best 
be fulfilled by allowing portions to be used for wharves and docks.94 
In a subsequent case a century later, the State argued that it owned 
certain submerged land as part of the public trust despite a patent 
conveying that land to a private owner.95 Based on earlier decisions, 
the court noted that where the grant was explicit as to its reserva-
tions (and did not include an encumbrance based on the public trust 
doctrine), the State could not later assert an interest.96 The lands 
were not encumbered by the public trust doctrine. 
8. Vermont 
In Vermont, the state's supreme court ruled that although a rail-
road company held fee simple title to filled lands along the city's 
waterfront, it did not hold title free ofthe public trust doctrine; there-
fore the lands could only be used for purposes approved by the legis-
lature as public uses.97 Should the company use the lands for anything 
90. Champlin's Realty Assocs., v. Tillson, 823 A2d 1162 (R.I. 2003). 
91. Id. at 1167. 
92. Id. at 1169. 
93. 23 Tex. 349 (1859). 
94. Id. 
95. Natland Corp. v. Baker's Port, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 52, 59 (Tex. App. 1993). 
96. Id. 
97. State v. Cent. Vermont Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989). 
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but railroad, wharf, or storage purposes, the State would have a right 
of re-entry.98 Quoting the California Mono Lake case, Vermont's 
high court stated: 
the core ofthe public trust doctrine is the state's authority as sov-
ereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over the 
navigable waters of the state and lands underlying those wa-
ters .... The corollary rule which evolved in tideland and lakeshore 
cases barfs] conveyance rights free of the trust except to serve 
trust purposes .... [p]arties acquiring rights in trust property 
generally hold those rights subject to the trust and can assert no 
vested right to use those rights in a manner harmful to the trust.99 
The Vermont court also cited a Massachusetts case involving early 
nineteenth-century statutes granting a wharf company the right to 
construct wharves in the Boston Harbor and hold them in fee sim-
ple. loo In 1964, a development company that had obtained the rights 
to the wharves attempted to confirm the title in the lands beneath 
them. The Massachusetts court ultimately decided that the develop-
ment corporation had title to the property, "but subject to the condi-
tion subsequent that it be used for the public purposes for which it 
was granted."lOl 
In a 2001 case, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled in favor ofthe 
State over a bank and condominium association. 102 A project held in 
condominium ownership had been developed over land that had 
once been part of a lake (it had been filled in the 1800s). The project 
was constructed on the land, and, ultimately, it was determined that 
the land over which it was constructed was part ofthe public trust. 
The bank and condominium association argued that the public trust 
doctrine should be modified to recognize the power ofthe legislature 
to convey public trust lands to private ownership. 103 While recogniz-
ing that this power does technically exist, the court did not find that 
the State clearly intended to convey the land free ofthe public trust 
98. Id. at 1135. 
99. Cent. Vermont Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d at 1132 (quoting Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior 
Court (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983». 
100. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979). 
101. Id. at 367. 
102. Cmty. Nat'l Bank v. State, 782 A.2d 1195 (Vt. 2001). 
103. Id. at 1197. 
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obligations. 104 Thus, the court affirmed that the bank and associa-
tion held the property subject to the state's public-trust-doctrine 
interest. While the property values decreased, 105 presumably some 
private use still existed (although the case is not clear). 
In sum, private ownership and use of public resources impressed 
with the public trust doctrine is allowed, so long as the private use 
conforms to public trust purposes. 
IV. ACCESS TO THE PUBLIC-TRUST-DOCTRINE RESOURCE 
Above the mean high water mark, several theories have been 
applied to give the public access to privately owned beach areas, 
including prescriptive easements, implied dedication, custom, and ex-
tension of the public trust. 106 This section focuses only on the exten-
sion of public trust doctrine, specifically those cases and secondary 
sources discussing access to public-trust-doctrine resources.107 Trust\' 
resources are often surrounded by privately owned property, raising 
questions of the public's ability to reach the resource. 108 While some 
jurisdictions hold that access to the resource is part ofthe public trust 
doctrine, this access is limited,109 and government agencies employ 
the police power to regulate access. no 
104. Id. at 1198. 
105. Id. at 1197. 
106. Linda A Malone, Public Rights in Beach Areas, in 1 ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF 
LAND USE § 3:4 (2013). 
107. See, e.g., A Dan Tarlock, Access to Public Waters·Beach Access, in LAw OF WATER 
RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 8:32 (2013) ("Because there is no privilege to trespass on private 
land to exercise a public right, the public may not enter on privately owned upland to reach 
public rights. Access must either be over public land open to the public or by the permission 
of the upland owner .... [T]he line between public rights and exclusive private property is 
eroding. There are two primary reasons. One is the practical problem that a citizen exercising 
a public right to use water cannot easily determine the water boundary. Also, some temporary 
upland use may be necessary to enjoy the public right. Second, in addition to these practical 
problems, there are pressures to expand access to public waters caused by a growing popula-
tion with an increasing taste for leisure. Courts and legislatures have responded both to the 
practical problems and to the pressures by creating new public rights of access. These public 
rights extend mainly to beaches, but limited rights to use the uplands bordering navigable 
recreational streams exist in some states."). 
108. RICHARD G. HILDRETH & RALPH W. JOHNSON, OCEAN AND COASTAL LAw 94 (1983) 
("Preserving public recreational access rights in navigable waters has become one ofthe prin-
cipal uses ofthe public trust doctrine."). 
109. See, e.g., Township of Neptune v. State, 41 A3d 792, 802 (N.J. App. Div. 2012) (holding 
that the State is under no obligation to dredge channels in a body of water to ensure access). 
110. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 727 A2d 491,497 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (upholding 
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Public trust access also has an equal-protection component: state 
and local governments cannot allow some members of the public to use 
the trust resource and deny others access without a rational basis. III 
Issues regarding equal access most often arise when a public trust 
resource is conveyed or leased to private parties, which inevitably, 
to some extent, deprives other members of the public access. 112 The 
public's right to use public trust resources bars the owners of prop-
erty contiguous to the resource from interfering with the public's law-
ful access. 113 
Some states define the public trust doctrine as including the 
protection of public access to navigable waters and of environmental 
quality.114 In a series of cases, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
conviction of the defendants for surfing when the beach had been closed due to a hurricane 
and stating that "[w]e need not, on these facts, determine the outer limits of such jurisdiction 
[of the Borough of Spring Lake] or the further relationship between the Public Trust Doctrine 
and territorial jurisdiction"); Sea Watch, Inc. v. Borough of Manasquan, 451 A.2d 192 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (holding that the municipality could charge a reasonable fee to use 
a walkway). 
111. Capano v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 530 F. Supp. 1254 (D.N.J. 1982). Applying New 
Jersey law, the court held that the public trust doctrine did not require the defendants to permit 
swimming on all ofthe beach areas of a city. Id. The city could not, however, allow a group of 
nuns to use a particular beach while denying access to other members of the public. Id. Cf 
Secure Heritage, Inc. v. City of Cape May, 825 A.2d 534, 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) 
(holding that establishing limits on the number of beach passes and on the transferability of pas-
ses was non-discriminatory and did not violate the public trust doctrine); Jersey City v. State 
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 545 A.2d 774,783 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (finding no violation of 
the public trust doctrine where a marina was to be open to the general public on a non-discrimi-
natory, first-come-first-serve basis, and commending that" [u ]nsubsidized market-mechanism 
price determination for berthing service does not alone imply invidious discrimination"). 
112. ABKA Ltd. P'ship v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Res., 635 N.W.2d 168, 182 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2001) ("In essence, a dockominium development attempts to offer a small class ofhoat 
owners the exclusive and permanent right to own and to occupy a portion of public trust waters 
and provides access to the waters to a select group ofthe·public, which fails to satisfy the pur-
pose of the public trust doctrine."); Kootenai Envtl. All., Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 
671 P.2d 1085, 1098 (Idaho 1983) (Bistline, J., concurring) (stating that a private yacht club 
"is not a public purpose which is within the power of the state to grant under its trust duties 
to the public which it serves"). 
113. In re Ownership of Sanders Beach, 147 P.3d 75,85 (Idaho 2006) (rejecting the argu-
ment by landowners oflakeside property that as part oftheir littoral rights they could exclude 
the public from the area between the high and low water mark during periods when water did 
not cover the area, on the grounds that this suggested littoral right "would be contrary to the 
central substantive thought in public trust litigation"); South Dakota Wildlife Fed'n v. Water 
Mgmt. Bd., 382 N.W.2d 26,30 (S.D. 1986) ("[T]he riparian owner may not interfere with or 
prevent the public's use or lawful access."). 
114. &e, e.g., State v. Sorensen, 436 N.W.2d 358 (Iowa 1989). In holding that the public 
trust applied to land formed by accretion from the Missouri River, the court noted that the 
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broadly defined public-access rights, requiring adjacent property 
owners to provide that access. 115 In Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 116 
the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a municipality could not 
discriminate between residents and non-residents when charging a 
fee for the use of a municipally owned beach.ll7 The issue raised was 
the right to ocean access under the public trust doctrine. The court 
concluded that the doctrine "dictates that the beach and the ocean 
waters must be open to all on equal terms.,,1l8 The court reasoned 
that the public trust doctrine requires the use of municipally owned 
dry-sand beaches to facilitate access to trust resources.1l9 
In 2003, Neptune City was affirmed when an appellate court held 
that a provision of an ordinance banning the sale and transferability 
of seasonable beach tags to the lodging industry "does not discrimi-
nate against non-residents nor does it offend the public trust doc-
trine.,,120 However, the section of the ordinance banning the sale of 
seasonable beach tags to hotels, motels, inns, and the like, while ~1-
lowing individuals to purchase transferable beach tags violated 
equal protection. l2l 
land was suited for public access to the river and took judicial notice "ofthe expanding involve-
ment of Iowans in recreational activities on or near navigable waters such as the Missouri 
River." Id. at 363. For a comprehensive analysis of this development, see Craig, Western 
States' Public Trust Doctrines, supra note 9. In DeWolf v. Apovian, No. 08 MISC 381982 HMG, 
2012 WL 3139702 (Mass. Land Ct. 2012), adhered to on reconsideration, 2012 WL 6684766 
(Mass. Land Ct. 2012), the Massachusetts Land Court held that the owner of a lot adjacent 
to a lot on which a jetty is located had no easement to use the jetty, but that "the structure 
and land between the mean high and mean low water marks remain subject to the rights of 
the public encompassed within the Public Trust Doctrine." Id. at *9. See also A. Dan Tarlock, 
The Public Trust, in LAw OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 8.18 (2013) C'Because the doc-
trine is almost entirely judge-made, in the early years of the environmental movements, lawyers 
seized upon the trust as a basis for judicial review of all resource choices. As a result, the clas-
sic public trust is being merged with the traditionally unrelated assertion of state ownership 
of water in trust for the people to produce judicial limitations on the exercise of all water 
rights." (citations omitted». 
115. For a complete overview of all New Jersey cases, see Thomas J. Fellig, Pursuit of the 
Public Trust: Beach Access in New Jersey from Neptune v. Avon to Matthews v. BIllA, 10 
CoLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 35 (1985). 
ll6. 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972). 
ll7. Id. 
ll8. Id. at 54. 
ll9. Id. See, e.g., Van Ness v. Borough of Deal, 393 A.2d 571,573 (N.J. 1978) (stating that 
its holding in Avon did not apply only to the wet-beach area between low and high water); see 
also Lusardi v. Curtis Point Prop. Owners Ass'n, 430 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1981). 
120. Secure Heritage, Inc. v. City of Cape May, 825 A.2d 534, 548 (N .J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2003). 
121. Id. at 549. 
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The decision in Neptune City raises the question of whether the 
same public beach access would be required if the dry-sand beach had 
not been publicly held. 122 In Matthews v. fuy Head Improvement Ass 'n, 
the court answered this question affirmatively. 123 There, an associa-
tion of property owners sought to restrict the public's access to beaches 
controlled by the association. Further expanding the public trust doc-
trine and access rights, the court held that the public must be afforded 
reasonable access to the shore and a suitable area for recreation on 
the dry sand, even if the public's rights on private beaches are not co-
extensive with the rights they enjoy on municipal beaches. l24 Ulti-
mately, the court required the owners association to open its beach 
by offering membership in the association to the public. 125 
In Raleigh Avenue Beach Ass'n v. Atlantis Beach Club, Inc. ,126 an 
appellate court clarified Matthews, liberally holding in favor of pub-
lic access and requiring that the owners of a private beach provide 
access across the dry sand for the public to enjoy trust resources. 127 
The court ignored the landowner's claims that public access would 
prevent the owner from generating a profit from serving its own 
clientele, would require the landowner to provide lifeguard services 
without charge, and would even address the fee that the landowner 
could charge. 128 
On the other hand, some jurisdictions are adamant that access 
across private land in order to reach a public trust resource is the 
equivalent of an easement, requiring compensation to the affected 
private landowner. Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire so 
require. Perhaps the clearest of these judicial declarations comes from 
Opinion of the Justices (Public Use of Coastal Beaches),129 in which 
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire rejected a statutory attempt 
to legislate access to public beaches across private property. Liberally 
citing the Maine case of Bell v. Town of Wells130 (which was decided 
122. Access to Trust Resources, in 1 STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 4:19 (2013). 
123. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984). 
124. Id. at 365-66. 
125. Id. at 369. 
126. 851 A.2d 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
127. Id. at 29 (rejecting the argument that no access was required because the public had 
other means of reaching the sea, in part because of "the inconvenience associated with the 
nearest available perpendicular access to the north"). 
128. Id. at 29-30, 33. 
129. 649 A.2d 604 (N.H. 1994). 
130. 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989). 
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on the constitutional right to exclude the public from private prop-
ertyl3l), the New Hampshire court held that "[a]lthough the State has 
the power to permit a comprehensive beach access and use program 
by using its power of eminent domain, it may not take property rights 
without compensation through legislative decree.,,132 The court closed 
by noting that "if the work is one of great public benefit, the public 
can afford to pay for it.,,133 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, there continues to be a lot of confusion between the public 
trust doctrine and the concept of the government generally holding 
property or resources in trust for its citizens. The former carries a 
lot more public responsibilities with it. The latter does or does not, 
depending upon the language of the constitution or legislation that 
establishes the resource as either a different kind of trust or no trust .. . 
at all. It is also clear that despite suggestions and commentary to the 
contrary, there is virtually no movement to extend the public trust 
doctrine beyond its traditional association with and application to 
water and water resources, submerged lands, and shoreland. l34 More-
over, it is abundantly clear that many private uses of public trust re-
sources are routinely permitted so long as the res publicum of the 
PTD is preserved and there is some public benefit to the private use. 
Finally, most state courts that have considered the matter do not 
extend the PTD to include the public's right to access the PTD re-
source across private property. Courts in New England are particu-
larly clear that if the public wants access to a PTD resource across 
private land, the public must pay for it. 
131. Id. at 178 (''The interference with private property here involves a wholesale denial 
of an owner's right to exclude the public."). 
132. Opinion of the Justices, 649 A.2d at 611. 
133. Id. (quoting Eaton v. B.C. & M.R.R., 51 N.H. 504, 518 (1872». 
134. The only true exception appears to be in New York, the courts of which extend the 
PTD to public parks. 

